




RESEARCH SEMINAR IN INTERNATIONAL ECONOMICS 
 
Gerald R. Ford School of Public Policy 
The University of Michigan 
Ann Arbor, Michigan 48109-3091 
 












Julian di Giovanni 
International Monetary Fund 
 
Andrei A. Levchenko 













Recent RSIE Discussion Papers are available on the World Wide Web at: 
http://www.fordschool.umich.edu/rsie/workingpapers/wp.html 







Firm size follows Zipf's Law, a very fat-tailed distribution that implies a few large rms account
for a disproportionate share of overall economic activity. This distribution of rm size is crucial
for evaluating the welfare impact of macroeconomic policies such as barriers to entry or trade
liberalization. Using a multi-country model of production and trade in which the parameters are
calibrated to match the observed distribution of rm size, we show that the welfare impact of
high entry costs is small. In the sample of the largest 50 economies in the world, a reduction in
entry costs all the way to the U.S. level leads to an average increase in welfare of only 3.25%. In
addition, when the rm size distribution follows Zipf's Law, the welfare impact of the extensive
margin of trade { newly imported goods { vanishes. The extensive margin of imports accounts
for only about 3.5% of the total gains from a 10% reduction in trade barriers in our model. This
is because under Zipf's Law, the large, inframarginal rms have a far greater welfare impact than
the much smaller rms that comprise the extensive margin in these policy experiments. The
distribution of rm size matters for these results: in a counterfactual model economy that does
not exhibit Zipf's Law the gains from a reduction in entry barriers are an order of magnitude
larger, while the gains from trade liberalization are an order of magnitude smaller.
JEL Classications: F12, F15
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There is growing recognition that the structure of the economy is important for understanding
economic outcomes as well as the impact of policies.1 This paper investigates the implications of
one particular characteristic of the economy { the distribution of rm size. The most striking fact
about the rm size distribution is that it is extremely fat tailed. Several studies have documented
that it follows a power law with an exponent close to  1, a result known as Zipf's Law.2
The literature has sought to explore under what conditions Zipf's Law can arise (see, e.g.,
Gabaix 1999, Luttmer 2007, Rossi-Hansberg and Wright 2007). By contrast, much less is known
about how this phenomenon aects economic outcomes.3 This paper explores how Zipf's Law
aects our conclusions about the welfare impact of two policy changes: a reduction in barriers
to rm entry and trade opening. We rst show that the welfare implications of these policies
are very sensitive to the assumption regarding the rm size distribution. We then quantify their
welfare impact in a calibrated multi-country general equilibrium model of production and trade,
emphasizing the channels at work and the features of the economy that are crucial for the results.
Ever since the inuential work of Djankov, La Porta, Lopez-De-Silanes and Shleifer (2002), it
has been known that cross-country dierences in the cost of entry by rms are pronounced. These
authors assemble data on the entry regulations in 85 countries, and document that the amount of
time, the number of procedures, and the costs { in either dollar terms or as a percentage of per capita
income { required to start a business vary widely between countries.4 The World Bank's Doing
Business Initiative collected data on regulations regarding obtaining licenses, registering property,
hiring workers, getting credit, and more. Almost invariably, the data show that the variation in
these regulations across countries is considerable. In addition, in a cross section of countries entry
barriers are robustly negatively correlated with per-capita income and other measures of welfare.
Parallel to the research on entry barriers, the recent advances in international trade have focused
attention on the role of individual rms, both in theory and the empirics. Naturally, when the unit
of the analysis is the rm, much of the emphasis has been placed on the entry decision into export
markets, the so-called \extensive margin." Many stylized facts have emerged: most rms do not
1To give but a few recent examples, Hsieh and Klenow (2008) demonstrate that correcting for misallocation of
resources across rms in India and China can raise TFP in those countries by as much as 50%; Carvalho (2008) nds
that aggregate uctuations can arise from sectoral shocks given the observed structure of the Input-Output matrix;
and Ghironi and Melitz (2005) show that the exporting behavior of individual rms helps explain the persistence of
PPP deviations.
2Axtell (2001) provides empirical evidence that the distribution of sales and employment in the Census of U.S.
rms follows Zipf's Law. Similar ndings obtain for several European countries (Fujiwara, Aoyama, Di Guilmi,
Souma and Gallegati 2004) and Japan (Okuyama, Takayasu and Takayasu 1999). Other phenomena known to follow
power laws include city size, income and wealth, and CEO compensation (Gabaix 2008).
3Exceptions include Gabaix (2009) and di Giovanni and Levchenko (2009), who study the implications of Zipf's Law
for macroeconomic volatility, and Gabaix and Landier (2007), who examine its relationship to executive compensation.
4To give one example, the ocial cost of following all the procedures to set up a business ranges from 0.5% of per
capita GDP in the U.S. to 4.6 times per capita GDP in the Dominican Republic.
1export, most exporters only sell small amounts abroad, while the bulk of exports at any one point
in time is accounted for by a relatively small number of rms (see, e.g. Bernard, Jensen, Redding
and Schott 2007). The extensive margin has been the focus of several theoretical and quantitative
exercises, such as Ghironi and Melitz (2005), Chaney (2008), and Helpman, Melitz and Rubinstein
(2008), among many others.
If entry is important { be it into production, or the export markets { it is becoming clear that one
of the ways it matters is through the varieties available as intermediate inputs in production. Jones
(2007, 2008) shows that the use of intermediate inputs creates a TFP multiplier that goes some way
to explaining observed income dierences across countries. Cowan and Neut (2007) were the rst to
argue that in countries with worse institutions, production will use fewer intermediates, adversely
aecting productivity. Acemoglu, Antr as and Helpman (2007) and Costinot (2009) provide models
that endogenize the number of varieties used in production as a function of economic institutions.
On the trade side, it has also been argued that imported intermediates play an important role in
domestic productivity.5 This suggests that in order to assess the welfare impact of entry, our model
must feature foreign and domestic intermediate inputs and the associated multiplier.
How does the existence of Zipf's Law inform our conclusions about the importance of domestic
or foreign entry, be it for consumption or as intermediate inputs? In other words, how much does
the extensive margin matter in a world dominated by the very large rms? To answer this question,
this paper sets up a workhorse multi-country model of international trade in the spirit of Melitz
(2003) and Eaton, Kortum and Kramarz (2008), and calibrates it paying special attention to the
parameters governing the size distribution of rms. In particular, we choose the model parameter
values such that rm size follows Zipf's Law. In addition, to capture the variation in xed costs of
entry across countries, our calibration uses entry cost data from the World Bank's Doing Business
Indicators database.
In a quantitative exercise, it is important to match the distribution of rm size because Zipf's
Law is a very special distribution. A random variable generating a power law with exponent between
 1 and  2 has innite variance. When the power law exponent is less than 1 in absolute value, the
mean becomes innite as well. Another way to put this is that the economy is dominated by a small
number of very large rms, or to use a term coined by Gabaix (2009), the economy is \granular."
We adopt this terminology throughout the paper, and refer to the calibration using Zipf's Law
as the granular calibration. We then contrast the quantitative implications of Zipf's Law with an
exercise in which the distribution of rm size has nite variance (labeling it the \non-granular"
case).
5For instance, Amiti and Konings (2007), Kasahara and Rodrigue (2008), Luong (2008), and Halpern, Koren
and Szeidl (2009) provide empirical evidence that newly available foreign intermediate inputs increased the TFP of
individual rms.
2The main results can be summarized as follows. First, welfare gains from a reduction in xed
costs of entry in the granular model are modest. In the sample of the largest 50 economies in the
world, a reduction in entry costs all the way to the U.S. level leads to an average increase in welfare
of only 3.25%. It turns out that the assumption of Zipf's Law matters a great deal here. Gains are
about 12 times higher in the non-granular calibration compared to the granular one. Second, the
gains from a 10% reduction in variable trade costs are far greater (by a factor of 15) in the granular
model compared to the non-granular one. Third, the intensive margin, given by the reduction in
the prices of existing imports, accounts for almost 98% of the total welfare impact of trade barrier
reduction. Somewhat surprisingly, the relative importance of the intensive margin is not aected
much by the Zipf's Law assumption. And nally, the extensive margin of foreign varieties accounts
for only 3.6% of the gains from a reduction in trade barriers in the granular calibration, compared
to 9% in the non-granular one.6
In summary, the distribution of rm size matters a great deal for whether xed or variable costs
have a larger welfare impact. In fact, depending on whether the rm size distribution is granular
or not, the conclusions are reversed: in the granular world xed costs matter little, while variable
costs a great deal; the opposite is true in the non-granular world.
What is the intuition for these results? The distribution of rm size is informative about the
relative importance of marginal exporters compared to the inframarginal ones for welfare. In a
granular world, the marginal exporters are far less productive, and therefore much smaller and sell
much less. As a result, their weight in the price index (this index corresponding roughly to the
inverse of welfare) is extremely low. By contrast, the inframarginal, extremely large rms sell a lot
and carry a large weight in the price index. Therefore, what happens to the large rms has a rst-
order impact on welfare. Put simply, suppose a country is already importing the most successful
brands of television sets: Sony, Panasonic, etc. A reduction in variable trade costs makes these
existing brands cheaper, but also has an impact on the extensive margin: it introduces many more
inferior brands of televisions into the country. The model calibrated to the empirically observed
distribution of rm size is telling us that the intensive margin { cheaper Sony TV sets { matters
far more for welfare than the many additional bad brands that are now available. In fact, we show
analytically that in the limit as the model parameters approach the values observed in the data,
the welfare impact of the extensive margin of foreign trade goes to zero.
We are not the rst to note that the welfare gains from new varieties may not be very large.
Arkolakis, Demidova, Klenow and Rodriguez-Clare (2008) argue that the welfare gains from new
imported goods will depend on the productivity of new varieties relative to existing ones, and that
6The disappearing domestic varieties (the domestic extensive margin) have a correspondingly negative welfare
impact.
3in practice, the price level adjustment due to new varieties is likely to be small.7 In addition, they
show that in the standard model of monopolistic competition with endogenous variety, gains from
trade are summarized by the overall trade volume relative to domestic absorption, something that
is also true in our model. Feenstra (2009) argues that in a Melitz model with free entry, the positive
welfare impact of newly imported varieties is exactly cancelled out by the negative welfare impact
of disappearing domestic varieties, resulting in gains from variety that are precisely nil.8
Conceptually, our paper oers two innovations. First, we make it explicit that the observed
distribution of rm size is informative about the relative importance of entry costs and the extensive
margin of imports, and use it to discipline the quantitative exercise. We contrast the welfare impacts
of xed versus variable trade costs, and show how the distribution of rm size aects their relative
magnitudes. Our results complement Feenstra's by demonstrating that under Zipf's Law, the
welfare impact of not only the \net extensive margin" { foreign plus domestic { but also of the
\gross extensive margin" { foreign and domestic individually { vanishes. In a sense, this is a stronger
result as it does not depend on the two gross margins cancelling out perfectly. Instead we show
that they are both vanishingly small in absolute value. And second, from a modeling standpoint,
our analysis features foreign and domestic varieties as intermediate inputs in production. This
turns out to be important: as we show below, the introduction of intermediate inputs aects both
analytical and quantitative results. Finally, this paper develops the quantitative implications of
reductions in entry costs and trade barriers for both the intensive and the extensive margins in a
calibrated multi-country model.
Before moving on to the description of the model, a caveat is in order for interpreting the
results. Our quantitative exercise does not strictly speaking tell us that the extensive margin does
not matter for welfare. As such, it is not in direct contradiction with the empirical studies that nd
a welfare impact of increased varieties (Broda and Weinstein 2006, Goldberg, Khandelwal, Pavcnik
and Topalova 2008). What our results demonstrate is that if the extensive margin is to matter for
welfare, it would be through channels not captured by the standard model in this paper. This is
important because the literature so far has overwhelmingly used this type model for the study of
the extensive margin. In other words, some other mechanisms need to be specied for the extensive
margin to have a discernible welfare impact.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents the theoretical framework. We
show how the parameters of the model govern the distribution of rm size, and how they can be
mapped into the empirical rm size distribution. We then derive a number of analytical results
that foreshadow the conclusions from the quantitative exercise. Section 3 solves the model economy
7In a dynamic two-country model of trade and innovation, Atkeson and Burstein (2008) argue that the impact of
the extensive margin on the rate of innovation is likely to be small as well.
8This result does not appear to hold in a Chaney (2008)-type model with a xed mass of entrepreneurs.
4numerically and presents the main quantitative results. Section 4 concludes.
2 Theoretical Framework
The world is comprised of N countries, indexed by i;j = 1;:::;N. In country i, buyers (who could












pi (k)Qi (k)dk = Xi;
where Qi(k) is the quantity sold of good k in country i, pi(k) is the price of this good, Xi is total
expenditure in the economy, and Ji is the number of varieties consumed in country i, coming from














Each country has a xed number of potential (but not actual) entrepreneurs ni, as in Eaton
et al. (2008), Chaney (2008), and Arkolakis (2008). Each potential entrepreneur can produce a
unique CES variety, and thus has some market power: it faces the demand for its variety given by
(1). There are both xed and variable costs of production and trade. Each entrepreneur's type is
given by the marginal cost a(k). On the basis of this cost, each entrepreneur in country i decides
whether or not to pay the xed cost of production fii, and which, if any, export markets to serve.
To start exporting from country j to country i, a rm must pay the xed cost fij, and an iceberg
per-unit cost of ij > 1.9
There is one factor of production, labor, with country endowments given by Lj, j = 1;:::;N.
Production uses both labor and intermediate inputs. In particular, the entrepreneur with marginal
cost a(k) must use this many input bundles to produce one unit of output. An input bundle consists




j , where wj is the wage
of workers in country j, and Pj is, as above, the ideal price index of all varieties available in j. Firm
k from country j selling to country i faces a demand curve given by (1), and has a marginal cost
ijcja(k) of serving this market. As is well known, the prot maximizing price is a constant markup
9That is, the rm in country j must ship ij > 1 units to country i in order for one unit of the good to arrive
there. We normalize the iceberg cost of domestic sales to one: ii = 1.
5over marginal cost, pi(k) = "




















Note that these are variable prots of a rm in country j from selling its good to country i only.
These expressions are valid for each country pair i;j, including domestic sales: i = j.
The production structure of the economy is pinned down by the number of rms from each
country that enter each market. In particular, there is a cuto marginal cost aij, above which
rms in country j do not serve market i. We assume (and later verify in the calibration exercise),
that all rms that decide to export abroad are suciently productive to also serve their domestic
markets. On the other hand, there is a range of productivities for which rms serve their domestic
markets, but choose not to export. In this case, rms with marginal cost above ajj in country j do
not operate at all. The cuto aij characterizes the entrepreneur in j who earns zero prots from












Closing the model involves nding expressions for aij, Pi, and wi for all i;j = 1;:::;N. The





















where Jij is the set of varieties exported from country j to country i. In order to solve the model,
we make the standard assumption that productivity, 1=a, is Pareto(b;), where b is the minimum
value productivity can take, and  regulates dispersion. The cdf of productivity is given by:






It is then straightforward to show that the marginal cost, a, has a distribution function G(a) =





















































Having expressed Pi and aij in terms of Xi and ci, for all i;j = 1;:::;N, it remains to close the
model by solving for the Xi's and wi's. To do this, we impose balanced trade for each country, and
6use the convenient property (originally noted by Eaton and Kortum 2005) that total prots in the
economy are a constant multiple of Xi.
Proposition 1 Total prots of rms based in country i are a constant multiple of total expenditure:
i = " 1
" Xi.
Proof: See Appendix A.
Since by denition total sales in the economy are equal to Xi, and the total prots are " 1
" Xi,





Xi. Labor receives a constant fraction  of the spending














































Using the trade balance conditions, Xi =
PN
j=1 Xji for each i = 1;:::;N, the expression for total








































i = 1;:::;N. There are N  1 independent equations in this system, which can be solved for wages
in N  1 countries given a num eraire wage in the remaining country. The wages and the price levels
in all countries are determined jointly by equations (9) for wages and (6) for prices. We will solve
these numerically in order to carry out the main quantitative exercise in this paper.
2.1 The Distribution of Firm Size: Model and Data
It has been argued that in the data, the distribution of rm size follows a power law, with an
exponent close to 1 in absolute value. In this section, we rst build a bridge between the model
and the data by showing that the distribution of rm sales in the workhorse model outlined above
7does indeed follow a power law. Consequently, we argue that the distribution of rm size in the
data places a key restriction on the important parameter values in the model. Finally, we review
the available empirical evidence on the rm size distribution.
Denote by lower case x(a(k)) the sales of an individual rm k. Firm sales x follow a power law
if
Pr(x > s) = cs : (10)
It turns out that the baseline Melitz-Pareto model delivers a power law in rm size. In our model,
the sales of a rm as a function of its marginal cost are: x(a) = Ca1 ", where the constant C
reects the size of overall demand, and we drop the country subscripts. Under the assumption that
1=a Pareto(b;), the power law follows:











































" 1 and  = 







The key point for connecting the model to the data is that in the model, the slope of the power
law is given by 
" 1. Since this exponent can also be estimated in the data, what we observe in
the data is informative about this combination of parameters. What do the data tell us about ?
Available estimates put it very close to 1, suggesting that the distribution of rm size follows Zipf's
Law. Figure 1 reproduces the now famous power law for rm size in the U.S. estimated by Axtell
(2001). The t of this relationship is typically very close: it is common to observe R-squareds in
excess of 0.99. Using a variety of estimation techniques, Axtell reports a range of estimates of 
between 0.996 and 1.059, very precisely estimated with a standard errors between 0.054 and 0.064.
It will become important below that the coecient estimates are never signicantly dierent from
1, and indeed never very far from 1 in absolute terms as well.
The question remains whether Zipf's Law obtains in the rm size distributions for many coun-
tries. Currently, no comprehensive set of results exists. Evidence for a limited set of European
countries is presented by Fujiwara et al. (2004) and for Japan by Okuyama et al. (1999). In Ap-
pendix C, we use ORBIS/AMADEUS { the largest publicly available rm-level dataset covering a
large number of countries { to show that rm size distributions are well approximated by a power
law, with exponents quite close to  1 in most countries.10
10Other related results also shed light on how fat-tailed size distributions are. For instance, it turns out that
measures of Balassa revealed comparative advantage also follow power laws with exponent close to  1 (Hinloopen
and van Marrewijk 2006)
8To summarize, existing estimates of the distribution of rm size put discipline on the parameters
of the Melitz-Pareto model. In particular, estimates suggest that 
" 1 is very close to 1. As we show
in a series of exercises below, this has some striking implications regarding gains from reductions
in entry barriers and trade costs, the relative importance of intensive and extensive margins, and
the ability of trade openness to explain income dierences between countries.
2.2 Entry Costs, Trade Openness, and the Magnitude of Gains from Trade
We now present a number analytical results about the relative importance of xed costs, trade
openness, and the extensive margin for welfare. Real income per capita in country i is proportional
to wi=Pi, which is also a measure of welfare.11 It is possible to use trade shares to simplify the
expression for the price level. Dene ij  Xij=Xi to be the share of total spending in country i


























Plugging this expression into the price level (6) and rearranging, welfare under trade in this economy














































































A special case of this expression is obtained if we adopt the assumption in Alvarez and Lucas
(2007), Chaney (2008), and di Giovanni and Levchenko (2009) that the number of productivity
draws in each country is proportional to its size: ni = Li, where  is a constant. In that case,





























11Welfare is proportional to the real wage even though in this economy there are prots. From Proposition 1,
prots are a constant multiple of the total expenditure, while due to the Cobb-Douglas functional form of the input
bundle, the wage bill wiLi is a constant multiple of total expenditure as well. Hence, the total prots in the economy
are a constant multiple of the wage bill, making the total welfare proportional to the real wage. See eq. (7).
9This expression is similar in spirit to Waugh (2007), with some key dierences. The similarity








and there is a \home market eect," such that larger countries have lower price levels and higher
real per-capita incomes, all else equal.
We can get a sense of the magnitudes involved by examining both the variation in the relative
xed costs and openness, as well as the exponents. We choose the parameter values as follows:
 = 0:5 from Jones (2008), " = 6 (Anderson and van Wincoop 2004), and  = 5:3, designed to
match the power law exponent on rm size to U.S. data, 
" 1 = 1:06 (Axtell 2001). Then, the















It is immediate that the relative xed costs will matter far less than the other two terms. In a
granular economy, what is really important for welfare is the presence of the large, very productive
rms, which are inframarginal and not aected much by the level of xed costs.




present in the data, and compute how much per-capita income variation those
can generate. It turns out that the country at the 95th percentile of the xed cost distribution has
an fii that is between 16 and 658 times the U.S. value, depending on the precise indicator we use.
Plugging those ratios into the equation above, we get that the country at the 95th percentile of
xed entry costs has an income level between 0.86 and 0.94 that of the U.S., all else equal. In a
granular economy, dierences in xed costs of entry cannot generate large per-capita income { and
welfare { dierences.




the economy in the 95th percentile of openness is 0.577. Taking that to the correct exponent implies
that this country has an income level 1.23 times that of the U.S. While the absolute variation in
ii
US;US
in the data is far lower than the variation in xed costs, the impact of trade openness on
welfare is larger.
The distribution of rm size matters for these magnitudes. To see what happens when we depart
from Zipf's Law, we set 
" 1 equal to 2 (implying a value of  = 10 given our chosen elasticity of
substitution). When the exponent on the power law in rm size is greater than or equal to 2,
the distribution of rm size has nite variance, and thus in Gabaix (2009)'s terminology, such an
economy is no longer granular. Thus, in our non-granular calibrations we set the exponent on the
power law in rm size to be the smallest such that the distribution still has a nite variance.








term drops by almost half, from 0.38 to 0.22. This implies that the importance of
xed costs rises: now, a country in the 95th percentile of the fii distribution has the income level
between 0.23 and 0.54 that of the U.S.. By contrast, the contribution of trade drops by half: the
95th percentile most open country has income per capita only about 1.12 of the U.S. level.
As a related point, granularity matters a great deal for the magnitude of gains from trade. In








A few things are notable about this expression. First, at a given ii, gains from trade are decreasing
in 
" 1 as long as " > 1.13 In other words, the more granular is the economy, the larger are the
gains from trade. This is intuitive: in the world dominated by ultra-productive rms, the big gains
from trade come from having access to those extremely productive foreign varieties. Using the
values of , ", and  described above, in the sample of 50 largest economies in the world, average
gains from trade are 13%, with a standard deviation of 11% across countries. Assuming instead
that 
" 1 = 2 (the economy is not granular) reduces the estimated mean gains almost in half (7%),
and the variation across countries in half as well (standard deviation of 6%).
Second, at a given level of trade openness (ii), gains from trade are increasing in the share of
intermediate goods in the input bundle, (1   ). This is an intermediate goods multiplier eect
akin to Jones (2008): the more foreign varieties are used as intermediate goods in production, the
more the country reaps a double benet from trade: rst as an increase in labor productivity due
to foreign intermediates, and second as consumers of those foreign varieties.
Finally, in order to get a sense of the gains from trade, it is sucient to simply look at the share
of spending on domestic goods. This feature has been noted about Ricardian models (Eaton and
12To nd an expression for gains from trade, it is useful to write out the autarky price level and welfare. Setting































































ii , yielding equation (12).
13This latter condition is likely to be satised in the data. Typical estimates of " range from 3 to 10, while  is on
the order of 0.5 (Jones 2008).
11Kortum 2002), as well as monopolistic competition models such as the one in this paper (Arkolakis
et al. 2008).
At the same time, in the presence of intermediate goods it is no longer the case that in order
to calculate the overall gains from trade, one needs to know only ii and the estimated elasticity
of trade with respect to (variable) trade costs, as argued by Arkolakis et al. (2008). As can be
gleaned from equation (8), the elasticity of bilateral trade with respect to ji is  . It is true that,
without intermediate goods, the gains from trade are given by 
  1

ii , so that the exponent on ii is
exactly the inverse of that elasticity. However, in the presence of intermediate inputs, that is not






. In other words, in order to assess the gains
from trade, we can no longer rely on one potentially observable object { the elasticity of bilateral
trade with respect to ji { and instead need to take a stand on other parameters of the model,
namely  and ".
In this context, it is worth noting that the rm size distribution provides an alternative source of
information regarding the model parameters. While at rst blush one may believe that it is easy to
estimate the elasticity of trade volumes with respect to trade costs, in fact one must typically make
a series of parametric assumptions about how the true trade costs ji are related to observables
such as distance or tari barriers. Things are further complicated by the fact that in the Melitz
model both ji and fji aect trade volumes, but with dierent elasticities. Since a typical gravity
regression cannot distinguish between the two, yet more assumptions on the nature of xed and
variable costs are needed to back out . The rm size distribution, by providing an estimate of
=(" 1), is an arguably cleaner way to calibrate the parameters of the model. In fact, as we show
in this paper, some key results actually depend on this combination of parameters, rather than 
and " individually.
2.3 Extensive vs. Intensive Margins
The granular economy is one dominated by few large producers, that are not likely to be \marginal"
exporters. Intuitively, this suggests that the distribution of rm size will also aect the relative
importance of intensive versus extensive margins for welfare. In this subsection we examine analyt-
ically the importance of the two margins. The conclusion is striking: as the rm-size distribution
converges to Zipf's Law, the welfare impact of extensive margin in exports (or indeed domestic
production) goes to zero.



















12Here, the price level is expressed in terms of the share of rms from country j supplying country i,
G(aij), precisely because it is the extensive margin: in any policy experiment, the change in G(aij)
is exactly the increase in the number (mass) of rms supplying market i. To derive the analytical
result in the simplest way, let us assume that the countries are symmetric: Li = L, ni = n, fii = f
8i, and ij = , fij = fX 8i;j, j 6= i. In that case, wages are the same in all countries, and we
normalize them to 1. The price levels are the same in all countries as well, and thus dropping the

















where aD is the cuto for domestic production, and aX is the cuto for exporting. These are of
course the same across all countries as well.
Note that since wages are normalized to 1, the total welfare in this economy is simply W = 1=P.
We are now ready to evaluate the relative importance of the extensive and intensive margins.
Imagine that there is a reduction in trade costs . This reduction will aect both the prices that
existing exporters charge in the domestic market, given by p(k) = "
" 1ca(k), and the mass of rms
serving the market, G(aX). From the expression for the price level (14), it is immediate that the





















The same is not true for the intensive margin. The price p that each exporter charges in
















The welfare impact of the intensive margin clearly does not converge to zero as  ! ("   1).
What is the intuition for these results? In a granular economy the most productive rms are
vastly better than the marginal rms. As a result, most of the welfare impact of trade is driven
by what happens to these best rms, rather than by whether trade liberalization leads to new
entry. That is, a reduction in trade costs impacts welfare mainly because the \major brands" {
Sony, Panasonic, etc. { become cheaper, rather than because the many additional inferior brands
of television sets become available.
This discussion shows that the conclusions about the impact of entry barriers, international
trade, and the extensive margin are very sensitive to whether or not we think the economy is
13granular. All else equal, the extensive margin matters less in the granular economy, and trade
openness matters more, as it allows the country to access the extremely productive varieties from
abroad.
Before proceeding to the quantitative assessment of the importance of entry costs and the
intensive and extensive margins of trade in a multi-country calibrated model, it is worth making
an additional remark regarding our modeling approach to xed costs. Arkolakis (2008) develops a
framework in which the xed costs of entry are replaced by smoother market penetration costs, and
rms choose not just whether to enter markets, but also what share of consumers to serve in each
market. Appendix B presents a model with market penetration costs, and shows that proportional
changes in welfare obtained in that model are identical to those in a simple xed costs model of
the main text. This result holds for all parameter values that govern the distribution of rm size
and the curvature of market penetration costs. In addition, we show that as the distribution of
rm size converges to Zipf's Law, the level of welfare in that model also becomes identical to the
baseline model. This is because under Zipf's Law, what matters most for welfare are the very large
rms, which are least aected by the introduction of the market penetration margin. The large
rms choose to penetrate markets fully, making their sales nearly the same as what they would be
in a simple xed cost model. For this reason, we choose to adopt the standard formulation of xed
costs of entry in our analysis.
3 Quantitative Evidence
In order to fully solve the model numerically, we must nd the wages and price levels for each
country, wi and Pi, using the system of equations given by (6) and (9). To solve this system, we
must calibrate the values of Li, ni, ij, and fij for each country and country pair, as well as the
parameters common to all countries. We now discuss how we calibrate each parameter value.
The elasticity of substitution is " = 6. Anderson and van Wincoop (2004) report available
estimates of this elasticity to be in the range of 3 to 10, and we pick a value close to the middle of
the range. The key parameter is , as it governs the slope of the power law. As described above,
in this model rm sales follow a power law with the exponent equal to 
" 1. In the data, rm sales
follow a power law with the exponent close to 1. Axtell (2001) reports the value of 1.06, which we
use to nd  given our preferred value of ":  = 1:06  ("   1) = 5:3. As mentioned above, we set
the share of intermediates  = 0:5, following Jones (2008).
For nding the values of Li, we follow the approach of Alvarez and Lucas (2007). First, we
would like to think of L not as population per se, but as \equipped labor," to take explicit account
of TFP and capital endowment dierences between countries. To obtain the values of L that are
internally consistent in the model, we start with an initial guess for Li for all i = 1;:::;N, and use
14it to solve the model. Given the vector of equilibrium wages, we update our guess for Li for each
country in order to match the ratio of total GDPs between each country i and the U.S.. Using the
resulting values of Li, we solve for the new set of wages, and iterate to convergence (for more on
this approach, see Alvarez and Lucas 2007). Thus, our procedure generates vectors wi and Li in
such a way as to match exactly the relative total GDPs of the countries in the sample. In practice,
the results are extremely close to simply equating Li to the relative GDPs of the countries. In
this procedure, we must normalize the population of one of the countries. We thus set LUS to its
actual value of 291 million as of 2003, and compute Li of every other country relative to this U.S.
value. Finally, we set ni in proportion to Li. That is, the country's endowment of entrepreneurs
is simply proportional to its \equipped labor" endowment. An important consequence of this
assumption is that countries with higher TFP and capital abundance will have a greater number of
potential productivity draws, all else equal. This is an assumption adopted by Alvarez and Lucas
(2007) and Chaney (2008). We set nUS = 10;000;000, that is, there are ten million potential rms
in the U.S.. In this calibration it implies that there are about 9,500,000 operating rms there.
According to the 2002 U.S. Economic Census, there were 6,773,632 establishments with a payroll
in the United States. There are an additional 17,646,062 business entities that are not employers,
but they account for less than 3.5% of total shipments. Thus, choosing nUS = 10;000;000 gets the
correct order of magnitude for the number of rms.
Next, we must calibrate the values of ij for each pair of countries. To do that we use the
set of gravity estimates from the empirical model of Helpman et al. (2008). That is, we combine
geographical characteristics such as bilateral distance, common border, common language, whether
the two countries are in a currency union and others, with the coecient estimates reported by
Helpman et al. (2008) to calculate values of ij for each country pair.14 Note that in this formulation,
ij = ji for all i and j.
Finally, we must take a stand on the values of fii and fij. The level of fUS;US is set to ensure an
interior solution for the domestic production cuto. Then, we use the information from the Doing
Business Indicators database (The World Bank 2007a) to set fii for every other country relative to
the U.S.. In this application, the particular Doing Business indicator is the amount of time required
to set up a business. We favor this indicator compared to others that measure entry costs either
in dollars or in units of per capita income, because in our model fii is a quantity of inputs rather
than value. To be precise, if according to the Doing Business Indicators database, in country i it
takes 10 times longer to register a business than in the U.S., then fii = 10  fUS;US.
To measure the xed costs of international trade, we use the Trading Across Borders module
14In di Giovanni and Levchenko (2009), as a robustness check, we also computed ij using the estimates of Eaton
and Kortum (2002). The advantage of the Helpman et al. (2008) estimates is that they are obtained in an empirical
model that accounts explicitly for both xed and variable costs of exporting, and thus corresponds most closely to
the theoretical structure in our paper.
15of the Doing Business Indicators. This module provides the costs of exporting a 20-foot dry-cargo
countainer out of each country, as well as the costs of importing the same kind of container into
each country. We take the bilateral xed cost fij to be the sum of the two: the cost of exporting
from country j plus the cost of importing into country i.15
We carry out the analysis on the sample of the largest 49 countries by total GDP, plus the 50th
that represents the rest of the world.16 These 49 countries together cover 97% of world GDP. We
exclude entrep^ ot economies of Hong Kong and Singapore, both of which have total trade well in
excess of their GDP, due to signicant re-exporting activity. Thus, our model is not intended to
t these countries. (We do place them into the rest-of-the-world category). The country sample,
sorted by total GDP, is reported in Table 1.
3.1 Model Fit
As described above, our iterative procedure ensures that the ratio of total GDPs in the model for any
two countries matches exactly the ratio of the total GDPs in the data. However, since the object of
the paper is to examine the role of trade openness in welfare, it is more important that the model
matches well the bilateral and overall trade volumes observed in the data. Comparing bilateral
trade patterns generated by the model to the actual data is a good test of the model's success
in describing the world economy, since the calibration procedure does not use any information on
actual trade patterns, only country GDPs and estimated bilateral trade costs.
Figure 2 reports the scatterplot of bilateral trade ratios ij = Xij=Xi. On the horizontal axis
is the natural log of ij that comes from the model, while on the vertical axis is the corresponding
value of that bilateral trade ow in the data. Hollow dots represent exports from one country to
another, ij, i 6= j. Solid dots, at the top of the scatterplot, represent sales of domestic rms as a
share of domestic absorption, ii. For convenience, we added a 45-degree line. It is clear that the
trade volumes implied by the model match the actual data well. Most observations are quite close
to the 45-degree line. It is especially important that we get the overall trade openness (1   ii)
right, since that will drive the gains from trade in each country. Figure 3 plots the actual values of
(1   ii) against those implied by the model, along with a 45-degree line. We can see that though
the relationship is not perfect, it is close.
Table 2 compares the means and medians of ii and ij's for the model and the data, and
reports the correlations between the two. The correlation between domestic shares ii the model
and the data for this sample of countries is around 0.48. The means and the medians look very
15An earlier version of the paper carried out the analysis setting the bilateral xed cost to be the sum of domestic
costs of starting a business in the source and destination countries: fij = fii + fjj. This approach may be preferred
if xed costs of exporting involved more than just shipping, and required, for instance, the exporting rm to create
a subsidiary for the distribution in the destination country. The results were virtually identical.
16We set the parameters, such as ij and fij, for the rest-of-the-world category as the average values among the
remaining countries in the world.
16similar as well, with the countries in the model slightly more open on average than the data. The
correlation between export shares, ij, is actually higher at 0.71.17
Overall, though the model calibration does not use any information on trade volumes, it ts
bilateral trade data quite well. We now turn to the analysis of welfare gains from reduction in entry
costs and trade barriers implied by the model.
3.2 Counterfactual I: Reduction in Entry Costs
Using the calibrated model above, the rst counterfactual we perform is a reduction in the xed
costs of entry fii and fij. We simulate a complete harmonization of entry costs across the world,
such that entry costs everywhere are the same as in the U.S.. This is a substantial improvement.
As rst shown by Djankov et al. (2002), the dierences in these xed costs are substantial across
countries. In our sample of the world's 49 largest economies, it takes on average 6 times longer to
start a business compared to the U.S.. For a country at the 75th percentile of the distribution, it
takes almost 8 times longer, and the country with the highest entry costs in this sample { Brazil
{ it takes 25 times longer than in the U.S.. This experiment also entails a substantial drop in the
xed costs of cross-border trade. The average exporting cost in this sample is 3 times higher than
in the U.S., and the average importing cost is 4 times higher.
Table 3 reports the associated welfare gains. The top panel presents the granular calibration, in
which rm-size distribution is set to match Zipf's Law. The bottom panel reports the non-granular
calibration, in which =("   1) = 2. Since by construction fij aects entry, but not the variable
costs of existing rms, we attribute all of the welfare gains to the extensive margin. The welfare
gains are small. We can see that even a dramatic drop (6-fold on average) in the xed costs of
production and exporting improves welfare by only 3.26% on average. It could be that this average
number is hiding a lot of heterogeneity, since dierent countries are experiencing a dierent size
reduction in trade costs. In parentheses below the average value, we report the range of welfare
gains in the entire sample. We can see that even in the country that gains the most from this
institutional improvement, the gain is only about double the average, at 7.32%. Zipf's Law matters
a great deal for this conclusion. In the bottom panel, we report that the welfare gain from the
same reduction in entry barriers is on average 40.87% in the non-granular world. This is 12 times
higher than in the Zipf's Law calibration. The range is also greater: the country gaining the most
more than doubles its welfare.18
17We also experimented with increasing the number of countries in the simulation to 60. The model t the data
well, though it over-predicted the overall average trade openness of countries by slightly more than the 50-country
model. In addition, there are more zeros in bilateral trade data in the 60-country sample compared to the 50-country
one. (With 50 countries, among the 2500 possible unidirectional bilateral trade ows, only 18 are zeros.) For these
reasons we conne our analysis to the largest 50 countries.
18An interesting question is how large is the role of international trade in generating this welfare gain. To get a
sense of this, we calculated the gains from the same reduction in xed costs of entry under the assumption that each
17The intuition for this result is that the distribution of rm size contains information on the
relative importance of the marginal and the inframarginal varieties. Under Zipf's Law, the infra-
marginal varieties { the very large rms { are overwhelmingly more important than the marginal
varieties. Thus, since the high entry costs do not aect the entry decision of the very large rms,
they do not have much impact on welfare. As our quantitative exercise demonstrates, this is true
even in a model that features a substantial intermediate input multiplier. As we move away from
Zipf's Law, the distribution of rm size becomes atter. As a result, entry of the marginal rms,
and consequently the xed costs of entry, become more important for welfare.
3.3 Counterfactual II: Reduction in Trade Barriers
Consider a global reduction in trade costs ij. How will it aect welfare, and what will be the
relative importance of the intensive and the extensive margins? We know that welfare in this
model is proportional to real income, Wi = wi=Pi. From equation (13), welfare can be expressed,




















A reduction in trade costs will impact the intensive margin, by making existing goods cheaper.
That is captured by the ij
cj
ci term. Additionally, welfare will increase due to the extensive margin,
by leading to a greater number of varieties. This is captured by the G(aij) term. Using a Taylor
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It is immediate from (16) that the extensive margin does not have much of a chance to impact
welfare. Any given change in the mass of new rms,
G(aij)
G(aij) , while it may be large, is pre-multiplied
by the term
 (" 1)
(" 1) , which goes to zero as the economy becomes more granular. As we saw above,
the calibrated value of this ratio is about 0.01.
country is in autarky. It turns out that the magnitude of the autarky gains is very similar. For instance, under the
granular calibration the autarky gain is 3.47%, compared to 3.26% in the baseline open economy case. We conjecture
that the average autarky percentage gain is slightly higher because in the absence of the possibility of importing, it
is more important to have access to the most domestic varieties.
18Table 3 reports the quantitative results for our sample of countries. A 10% reduction in trade
barriers leads to an average increase in welfare of about 4.3%, with a range between 0.28 and 8.26%.
Notably, this is somewhat higher than welfare gain we saw following a complete harmonization of
entry barriers across countries. It turns out that the intensive margin accounts for 97.6% of the
overall welfare gain. The table breaks down the extensive margin into the component coming from
the new foreign varieties, and the component due to the disappearance of some domestic ones. The
foreign extensive margin contributes 3.6% of the total welfare gain. It is partially undone by the
domestic extensive margin, which is negative. As we can see, in Zipf's world, the extensive margin
plays a minimal role relative to the intensive one.
It is important to emphasize that this result is not due to a small increase in the number of
foreign varieties. In this experiment, the 10% reduction in ij leads to an average 28% increase in
the number of imported foreign varieties in this set of countries. The extensive margin, as measured
by the number of varieties, is quantitatively important. However, its contribution to welfare is not.
The bottom panel reports these results with the non-granular calibration. Two features are
most striking. First, the overall gains from a 10% reduction in ij are tiny compared to the
granular calibration. The average gains are only 0.28% (less than one third of one percent), with
a maximum of 1.7%. This is 15 times lower than the same reduction in trade costs in the granular
calibration. Second, the overall importance of the intensive margin is almost the same as in the
granular calibration, 95.5%. At rst glance this is surprising. But it turns out that the welfare
impact of the foreign extensive margin is indeed much bigger than in the granular calibration, as
expected. The foreign extensive margin contributes 9% of the total welfare gain, 2.5 times greater
than in the granular calibration. However, the domestic extensive margin is also more important
for welfare, contributing {4.5% of the total impact. That is, the disappearance of existing domestic
varieties that accompanies the drop in trade costs also has a greater (negative) welfare impact
compared to the granular case. The two partially cancel out, leaving the relative importance of the
intensive margin roughly unchanged.
The main results are presented graphically in Figure 4. On the x-axis is the power law exponent
in rm size, =("   1), which varies from 1.06 (Zipf's Law calibration) to 2. The lines display the
welfare impact of the two counterfactual experiments we consider: a 10% reduction in ij (solid
line) and the complete harmonization in fij to their U.S. level. The gure illustrates the importance
of the rm size distribution for our conclusions about welfare. In particular, it is clear that changes
in variable costs matter more for welfare as the economy becomes more granular, while changes in
xed costs matter less.
193.4 Impact of Varying Intermediate Goods Share in Final Production
How important is the intermediate goods multiplier in our counterfactual exercises?19 In order to
examine this question, we vary , which is set to 0.5 in the baseline (equal shares of labor and
intermediate goods for nal production). Table 4 presents the total welfare changes in the two
counterfactual exercises for  equal to 0.33 (smaller share of labor/larger share of intermediate
goods) and 0.67 (larger share of labor/smaller share of intermediate goods) for the granular sim-
ulations. We also include the baseline case for comparison. The welfare impact of the same rm
entry cost and trade openness changes decreases monotonically as  increases (the intermediate
goods share falls). Increasing the intermediate input share from 1=2 to 2=3 ( = 0:33) increases
the welfare gain from a reduction in xed costs by about 50%. The same absolute change in  in
the other direction ( = 0:67) reduces the welfare gains by less than a percentage point relative to
the baseline case. Finally, the last column of the table presents the case of no intermediate goods
multiplier ( = 1, and therefore c = w). We see that the welfare gains from a reduction in entry
costs are reduced roughly in half compared to the baseline case. To summarize, the variation in
the share of intermediates in production has an important eect on welfare. Though we do not
pursue this point further here, our comparative statics suggest that gains from trade may dier
substantially across countries depending on their export specialization: countries that specialize
in industries requiring lots of (foreign) intermediates will gain from trade substantially more than
countries that simply produce output using the domestic factors of production.
4 Conclusion
The world economy and world trade ows are dominated by very large rms. This paper studies
the implications of this stylized fact for two related aspects of the economy: entry costs and the
extensive margin of exports. Our conclusions about the welfare impact of higher entry barriers
and the extensive margin of trade are very sensitive to the assumptions on the size distribution of
rms. In a model calibrated to match the observed rm-size distribution, the welfare costs of entry
barriers are low. By contrast, gains from reductions in trade costs are much higher than in a model
that does not exhibit Zipf's Law in rm size. Finally, the extensive margin accounts for less than
3% of the overall gains from trade.
What should we take away from this exercise? Quantitative evidence cannot be used to argue
19The idea of the intermediate goods multiplier in the closed-economy setting is due to Jones (2008), who in
addition assumes that intermediate inputs are complements in production to get an even larger eect, and explain
potentially all the variation in per-capita incomes across countries. In the multi-country model of production with
endogenous varieties, it would not be possible to incorporate complementarities of inputs, since producers of varieties
are monopolistically competitive, and their prot maximization problem is not well dened when the elasticity of
substitution is less than 1. Thus, we adopt the setup in which the elasticity of substitution in production and
consumption is the same.
20that entry costs and the extensive margin of trade are not important for welfare. We can establish,
however, that the canonical model of production and trade with endogenous variety cannot generate
a signicant welfare impact of entry barriers and the extensive margin, while at the same time
matching both the empirically observed distribution of rm size and trade volumes. If these matter,
it must be through some other channel. Uncovering the conditions under which the costs of entry
into domestic and foreign markets matter more remains a fruitful avenue for future research.
In this context, our results have implications for the trade versus institutions debate. There
is no consensus regarding the relative importance of trade openness and economic institutions in
explaining income dierences. Rodrik, Subramanian and Trebbi (2004) and Rigobon and Rodrik
(2005) argue that once institutions are controlled for, trade openness has no impact on income.
By contrast, Dollar and Kraay (2003) and Alcal a and Ciccone (2004) make the case that trade
openness matters independently of institutions. The quantitative results in the paper imply that
trade has a far greater impact than one particular form of institutions { entry barriers. A reduction
in the variable trade costs of only 10% has the a greater welfare impact than even the complete
elimination of entry barrier dierences across countries. More generally, the results imply that to
evaluate the relative importance of trade versus domestic regulation for welfare, we must carefully
take into account the underlying structure of the economy.
21Appendix A Proof of Proposition 1































The total xed costs paid by rms in country i to enter market j are equal to fjicini (baji)
.
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Therefore, the total xed costs paid by rms in i to export to j are a constant multiple of Xji:
nj (baji)
 cifji =





Therefore, the total prots from selling to j from country i are:
ji = V
ji  


























Since in equilibrium total income equals total expenditure in each country, Xi =
PN
j=1 Xji, leading
to the result that i =
(" 1)
" Xi.
22Appendix B Model with Market Penetration Costs
A recent contribution by Arkolakis (2008) emphasizes that the model with simple xed costs of
accessing markets is too stark. Instead, Arkolakis (2008) proposes a model in which rms choose
not only whether to enter a particular market, but what share of the consumers in that market
to serve. Arkolakis (2008) and Eaton et al. (2008) demonstrate that modeling entry costs in this
more continuous way is important to account for the empirical regularity that many rms export
only small amounts abroad. In this Appendix, we extend the baseline model to feature market
penetration costs instead of xed entry costs, and demonstrate that the total welfare in such a
model diers from the baseline only by a constant. As a result, in any policy experiment the
market penetration costs model produces welfare changes that are identical to the baseline xed
costs model.
Our functional form assumption follows Eaton et al. (2008). Assume that rather than paying
the xed cost fijcj to gain access to all consumers in market i, a rm in country j incurs a cost
fijcj





to reach a share s of consumers in that market. Given the demand for its variety by the consumer
reached in country i, the rm with marginal cost a(k) from country j maximizes its prots by
choosing both its price and market penetration si(k) optimally. The prots are given by:












where the price index, Pi, now aggregates over the prices of varieties available to a typical consumer
in i, and not over all the varieties that are sold in that country. It is easily veried that the price
is still a constant markup over the marginal cost. Optimal market penetration for a rm with
marginal cost a(k) is given by:









Finally, the rm will only enter market i if at zero market penetration, prots are increasing in s:
@i(k)
@s js=0 > 0. It turns out that the cuto aij for positive sales from j to i has the exact same
form as in the baseline model, and is given by equation (4). That expression can be combined with











As rst observed by Arkolakis (2008), the baseline model with simple xed costs provides








approaches 1 and the rm penetrates the entire market. This result
does not rely on the Zipf's Law assumption: the market penetration ratio si(k) does not depend on
the combination of parameters 
" 1. As we argue at the end of this section, Zipf's Law does imply
that the large rms are the ones most important for welfare, and thus the assumption of simple
xed costs adopted in the main text will not substantially aect our conclusions.
Under the Pareto distribution of productivity draws, the expression for the price level in country
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Comparing equations (6) and (B.2), it is clear that the price levels in the baseline model and the
market penetration cost model dier only by a constant. The rest of the solution is unchanged. In
particular, it is straightforward to show that Proposition 1 still holds, and that the wages are still





i for all i = 1;:::;N that solve the system of equations given by (9) and (B.2).
We now state the main result of this Appendix.
Proposition 2 Let the vectors [w1;:::;wN] and [P1;:::;PN] jointly be a solution to the system of

















=  [P1;:::;PN] (B.4)
are a solution to the system of equations (B.2) and (9) that dene the equilibrium in the market
penetration costs model.









when the latter is dened by (B.4), since  cancels out from
the numerator and the denominator. We now show that as long as (B.3) is satised, (B.4) holds as








provides a solution to the market penetration
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Since the vector [P1;:::;PN] satises (6), we have shown that  [P1;:::;PN] satises (B.5), which
completes the proof.
The main consequence of Proposition 2 is that the total welfare in the market penetration costs





(1=)wi=Pi. This implies that any percentage change in welfare calculated in this model will be
identical to the baseline in the main text.
One additional remark is worth making on the relationship between the market penetration










Setting  = 1 the expression in the square brackets becomes (" 1)=.20 Therefore, it is immediate
that as we approach Zipf's Law,  ! 1 and the welfare level in the market penetration cost model
converges exactly to the welfare level in the simple xed costs model. This is intuitive: under Zipf's
Law, what matters the most for welfare are the biggest rms, for which the market penetration
margin matters the least, since they choose to serve the entire market.
20This is the value of  preferred by Arkolakis (2008). Using Simulated Method of Moments, Eaton et al. (2008)
indeed estimate a value of  = 0:91 with a standard error of 0.12. This type of value for  implies a fair amount of
curvature to the market penetration costs, and thus many rms that choose to penetrate only a small share of the
export market. The xed cost model obtains instead when  = 1.
25Appendix C Power Laws in Firm Size in the ORBIS/AMADEUS
Database
This Appendix uses a large cross-country rm-level database to assess whether Zipf's Law approx-
imates well the distribution of rm size in a large sample of countries. Though we use the largest
available non-proprietary rm-level database in this analysis, the results should be interpreted with
caution: coverage is quite uneven across countries and years, implying that power law estimates
may not be reliable or comparable across countries. Nonetheless, as we describe below, Zipf's Law
provides a good approximation for the rm size distribution in most countries in this sample.
We estimate power laws in rm size using ORBIS, a large multi-country database published
by Bureau van Dijk that contains information on more than 50 million companies worldwide. The
data come from a variety of sources, including, but not limited to, registered lings and annual
reports. Coverage varies by world region: there are data on some 17 million companies in the
U.S. and Canada, 22 million companies in the 46 European countries, 6.2 million companies from
Central and South America, 5.3 million from Asia, but only 260,000 from Africa and 45,000 from
the Middle East. Importantly, the database includes both publicly traded and privately held
rms. For 41 European countries, the AMADEUS database also published by Bureau van Dijk
contains similar information but often has better coverage (more rms). In addition, the data in
AMADEUS appear more standardized across countries. Thus, for countries with better coverage
and data quality in AMADEUS compared to ORBIS, we use information from the former database.
While in principle data are available going back to mid-1990s for some countries, coverage improves
dramatically for more recent years. For this reason, we focus our analysis on 2006, the year with
the most observations available. The main variable used in the analysis is total sales. We restrict
our empirical analysis to countries that have sales gures for at least 1000 rms in 2006.
In order to obtain reliable estimates, this paper uses three standard methods of estimating
the slope of the power law . The rst method, based on Axtell (2001), makes direct use of the
denition of the power law (10), which in natural logs becomes:
log(Pr(x > s)) = log(c)   log(s): (C.1)
For a grid of values of sales s, the estimated probability Pr(x > s) is simply the number of rms
in the sample with sales greater than s divided by the total number of rms. We then regress the
natural log of this probability on log(s) to obtain our rst estimate of . Following the typical
approach in the literature, we do this for the values of s that are equidistant from each other on
log scale. This implies that in absolute terms, the intervals containing low values of s are narrower
than the intervals at high values of s. This is done to get a greater precision of the estimates: since
there are fewer large rms, observations in small intervals for very high values of s would be more
26noisy.
The second approach starts with the observation that the cdf in (10) has a probability density
function
f(s) = cs (+1): (C.2)
To estimate this pdf, we divide the values of rm sales into bins of equal size on the log scale,
and compute the frequency as the number of rms in each bin divided by the width of the bin.
Since in absolute terms the bins are of unequal size, we regress the resulting frequency observations
on the value of s which is the geometric mean of the endpoints of the bin (this approach follows
Axtell 2001). Note that the resulting coecient is an estimate of  ( + 1).21
Table A1 reports the results. The left panel reports estimates of equation (C.1), the right panel,
equation (C.2). (Note that the right panel's estimates are of  ( +1), thus they should dier from
the right panel by about  1.) The columns report the power law coecient, the R2, and the p-value
of the test that the coecient diers from  1 ( 2 in the right panel). Several things are worth
noting about these results. First, the power law approximates the data well: with the exception of
the U.K., the R2's are all well above 0.9. Second, most of the power law coecients are very close
to 1 in absolute value, and many are not statistically dierent from  1. Those that are statistically
dierent from  1 tend to be lower in absolute value, implying that if the rm size distribution
follows a power law in those countries, it is even more fat-failed than Zipf. Aside from the U.K.
{ whose rm-size distribution does not appear to be well approximated by a power law, at least
in this database { the least fat-tailed countries have the power law exponent of about  1:2, still
quite far from  2 and thus comfortably within the granular range. Finally, the country sample
is diverse: it includes major European economies (France, Germany, Netherlands), smaller E.U.
accession countries (Czech Republic, Estonia), major middle income countries (Brazil, Argentina),
as well as the two largest emerging markets (India and China).
It is important to note that these results do not establish that the distribution of rm size in
these countries follows a power law, as opposed to some other distribution. Indeed, as noted by
Gabaix (2008), with more paratemeters (allowing for more curvature), one will always t the data
better. Rather, Gabaix (2008) suggests that what is important is whether a power law provides a
good t to the data, which appears to be the case in our results.
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30Table 1. Top 49 Countries and the Rest of the World in Terms of 2004 GDP
GDP/ GDP/
Country World GDP Country World GDP
United States 0.300 Indonesia 0.006
Japan 0.124 South Africa 0.006
Germany 0.076 Norway 0.006
France 0.054 Poland 0.005
United Kingdom 0.044 Finland 0.005
Italy 0.041 Greece 0.004
China 0.028 Venezuela, RB 0.004
Canada 0.026 Thailand 0.004
Brazil 0.021 Portugal 0.003
Spain 0.020 Colombia 0.003
India 0.017 Nigeria 0.003
Australia 0.016 Algeria 0.003
Russian Federation 0.015 Israel 0.003
Mexico 0.015 Philippines 0.003
Netherlands 0.015 Malaysia 0.002
Korea, Rep. 0.011 Ireland 0.002
Sweden 0.010 Egypt, Arab Rep. 0.002
Switzerland 0.010 Pakistan 0.002
Belgium 0.009 Chile 0.002
Argentina 0.008 New Zealand 0.002
Saudi Arabia 0.007 Czech Republic 0.002
Austria 0.007 United Arab Emirates 0.002
Iran, Islamic Rep. 0.007 Hungary 0.002
Turkey 0.007 Romania 0.002
Denmark 0.006 Rest of the World 0.027
Notes: Ranking of top 49 countries and the rest of the world in terms of 2004 U.S.$ GDP. We include Hong
Kong, POC, and Singapore in Rest of the World. Source: The World Bank (2007b).
31Table 2. Bilateral Trade Shares: Data and Model Predictions for the 50-Country Sample
model data








Notes: This table reports the means and medians of domestic output (top panel), and bilateral trade (bottom










































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































33Table 4. Welfare Gains when Varying Share of Intermediate Goods in Final Production
Total change in welfare
 = 0:33  = 0:5  = 0:67  = 1
Counterfactual (baseline)
Complete harmonization 5.03 3.26 2.41 1.60
of entry costs (0.06, 11.37) (0.03, 7.32) (0.02, 5.39) (0.00, 3.58)
10% reduction in  4.79 4.33 4.07 3.80
(0.22, 8.87) (0.28, 8.26) (0.32, 7.85) (0.37 7.37)
Notes: This table reports the welfare increase, in percentage points, due to each counterfactual experiment. The
numbers in parentheses indicate the range across the 50 countries in the sample. 1    equals the share of
intermediate goods in nal production. These counterfactuals are done assuming

" 1 = 1:06 (Zipf's World).
Figure 1. Estimated Power Law in Firm Size in the U.S. (Axtell, 2001).
Notes: Reproduced from Axtell (2001). This gure depicts the power law in rm size in the U.S.: it plots
the log frequency of the rms against log of rm size, measured by the number of employees. The solid
line is the OLS regression t through the data. The estimated slope coecient is -2.059 (s.e. 0.054), which
implies  = 1:059. The adjusted R
2 is 0.992. Similar relationships are also reported for sales.






























































Notes: This gure reports the scatterplot of domestic output (ii) and bilateral trade (ij), both as a share
of domestic absorption. The values implied by the model are on the horizontal axis. Actual values are on the
vertical axis. Solid dots represent observations of ii, while hollow dots represent bilateral trade observations
(ij). The line through the data is the 45-degree line.
35Figure 3. Trade Openness: Data and Model Predictions






































































Notes: This gure reports total imports as a share of domestic absorption (1   ii). The values implied by
the model are on the horizontal axis. Actual values are on the vertical axis. The line through the data is
the 45-degree line.
36Figure 4. The Welfare Impact of Reductions in Fixed and Variable Costs and the Size Distribution
of Firms
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More granular Less granular
Notes: This gure reports the percentage changes in welfare due to a reduction in iceberg trade costs (solid
line, left axis) and a reduction in xed costs of entry (dashed line, right axis), as a function of the distribution
of rm size.
37Table A1. Country-by-Country Estimates of Power Laws in Firm Size
CDF Estimation PDF Estimation
Country PL Coef. R2 p-value PL Coef. R2 p-value
Austria -1.207** 0.993 0.0000 -2.160** 0.998 0.0002
Belgium -0.724** 0.952 0.0002 -1.662** 0.987 0.0001
Germany -1.035** 0.985 0.3767 -1.998** 0.996 0.9528
Denmark -0.627** 0.938 0.0000 -1.626** 0.985 0.0001
Estonia -0.739** 0.962 0.0001 -1.591** 0.992 0.0000
Finland -0.815** 0.988 0.0000 -1.747** 0.999 0.0000
France -0.960** 0.993 0.1420 -1.959** 0.998 0.1066
U.K. -1.349** 0.704 0.2133 -2.265** 0.870 0.3604
Greece -1.018** 0.987 0.6112 -1.965** 0.997 0.2878
Croatia -0.719** 0.924 0.0009 -1.675** 0.978 0.0014
Ireland -0.662** 0.966 0.0000 -1.702** 0.923 0.0686
Italy -1.009** 0.990 0.7647 -2.041** 0.996 0.3070
Netherlands -0.891** 0.979 0.0175 -1.845** 0.990 0.0193
Norway -0.852** 0.995 0.0000 -1.838** 0.997 0.0002
Slovakia -1.161** 0.981 0.0068 -2.071** 0.984 0.3919
Sweden -0.861** 0.998 0.0000 -1.874** 0.999 0.0001
Argentina -0.977** 0.998 0.1384 -1.938** 0.999 0.0185
Brazil -1.107** 0.977 0.0599 -2.051** 0.992 0.3785
Canada -0.969** 0.999 0.0200 -1.968** 0.999 0.1847
Switzerland -0.826** 0.995 0.0000 -1.782** 0.999 0.0000
China -1.117** 0.985 0.0159 -2.084** 0.998 0.0253
Czech Republic -0.915** 0.973 0.0934 -1.929** 0.989 0.2835
Spain -0.955** 0.996 0.0318 -1.963** 0.998 0.1931
Hungary -0.975** 0.995 0.2407 -1.933** 0.998 0.0347
Lithuania -1.189** 0.982 0.0024 -2.129** 0.990 0.0723
Latvia -1.201** 0.985 0.0008 -2.133** 0.993 0.0359
Portugal -1.035** 0.989 0.2987 -1.993** 0.998 0.8170
Russia -1.033** 0.996 0.1317 -2.016** 0.997 0.6782
Ukraine -0.940** 0.994 0.0190 -1.909** 0.999 0.0011
Australia -1.105** 0.991 0.0064 -2.018** 0.982 0.8300
India -0.870** 0.978 0.0066 -1.816** 0.993 0.0020
Japan -0.957** 0.993 0.1052 -1.989** 0.995 0.8035
Korea -0.893** 0.997 0.0000 -1.873** 0.998 0.0004
Mexico -0.616** 0.982 0.0000 -1.623** 0.993 0.0000
Malaysia -0.930** 0.980 0.1030 -1.789** 0.993 0.0006
Singapore -0.828** 0.973 0.0017 -1.774** 0.993 0.0004
Thailand -0.920** 0.958 0.1993 -1.807** 0.996 0.0004
Taiwan POC -0.830** 0.975 0.0014 -1.763** 0.994 0.0001
Notes: ** { signicant at the 1% level. This table reports the estimated of power laws in rm size across
countries. Column \PL Coef." reports the coecient on the power law for each country, the second column
reports the R
2, the third column reports the p value of the test that the power law coecient is statistically
dierent from  1 ( 2 in the right panel). The estimates are based on 2006 rm-level sales data from
ORBIS/AMADEUS. Variable denitions, sources, and estimation techniques are described in detail in the
text.
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